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1Abstract
Theory suggests that intergenerational ﬁnancial transfer is the indicator of
whether a family is borrowing-constrained in ﬁnancing its children’s human
capital investments. Yet measurement error in ﬁnancial transfer would generate
misclassiﬁcation error between the constrained and unconstrained groups. By
employingtheswitchingregressionswithimperfectsampleseparationtocorrect
for this misclassiﬁcation error, we show that the intergenerational mobility of
consumption for constrained families is much less than unconstrained families,
contradictory to what the theory implies. The results are robust to choices of
proxy variables as well as cut-os to divide the sample.
21 Introduction
Existing literature has established the pivotal role that the family background plays
in a person’s economic achievement. Less obvious and still in debate is what aspects
of parental characteristics would be more important than others: ﬁnancial wealth,
inheritable innate endowments, educational attainments, social networks, or time
and eorts spent with children? To evaluate the impact of family ﬁnancial wealth on
the next generation’s wellbeing, a useful channel to obtain quantitative evidence is
to compare the degree of intergenerational mobility between ﬁnancially constrained
families and unconstrained ones1, as articulated by Becker and Tomes (1986).
The Becker-Tomes model links the distinction of constrained and unconstrained
families to the existence of ﬁnancial assets transfers from parents to children: if the
child is very able or smart, then the rate of return from human capital investment on
him/her is suciently high; his/her parents would keep spending family wealth on
the child’s human capital until the rate of return drops to the returns from directly
transferring ﬁnancial assets. Consequently, for constrained families not endowed
with adequate wealth to match the human capital investment needs, parents are
constrained becausethey cannot putchildren’s future incomeas collateral toborrow
funds, and consequently, no ﬁnancial transfers from parents to children occur.
In empirical work, how to divide a sample into two such groups is never ob-
vious. Sticking literally to zero transfers as the delimitation value would be unre-
alistic, for even the poorest parents may still manage to leave their children some-
thing; this method would thereby misclassify these parents into the unconstrained
group. In fact, any other non-zero pre-speciﬁed cuto for this purpose will raise
1Or ”poor” families and ”rich” families, as used in Becker (1989) and Gaviria (2002).
3the same red ﬂag, for it is completely arbitrary to use any particular value over
others. Regardless of what cut-os will be used, any measurement error in the
transfer variable will cause the misclassiﬁcation muddling with empirical inves-
tigation into either group. Several inﬂuential studies of liquidity constraints and
consumption have acknowledged or echoed this concern but failed to address it
(Bernanke 1984, Zeldes 1989, Runkle 1991, Chetty 2008).
This paper utilizes switching regressions with imperfect sample separation to
correct for the misclassiﬁcation error, and the estimates stand decisively in con-
trast with the implications derived from borrowing constraints in human capital
investment. The results are robust to dierent variables as well as dierent cut-
os adopted to deﬁne constrained versus unconstrained families and ﬁt data better.
To our knowledge, Mulligan’s (1997, 1999) works are the only ones before this pa-
per that estimates U.S. intergenerational consumption persistence from the angle of
borrowing constraints. Our results not only unambiguously conﬁrm his tentative
ﬁndings, but also show that the gap between the constrained and unconstrained is
indeed much greater and much more robust, calling for further research.
On its implications, our paper joins others in the literature that cast doubts on the
materialeectsofliquidityconstraintsintheintergenerationaltransferbyexamining
the intergenerational mobility or other aspects. Among them, Grawe (2004) argues
that the non-linearity pattern in earnings mobility for a population can be justiﬁed
even in the absence of borrowing constraints. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko (1997)
ﬁnds that the elasticity of parental transfers to income redistribution from children
to parents who have made transfers is much less than the theory would imply,
assuming the intergenerational altruism is strong enough for parents to alleviate
4children’s liquidity constraints.
Switching regressions with imperfect sample separation have not been heavily
used in studies related to aspects of liquidity constraints: only Garcia, Lusardi, and
Ng (1997) employ switching regressions to test implications derived from life-cycle
permanent income versus liquidity constraints hypothesis, and the identiﬁcation
they rely on comes from empirical documentation in an earlier study by Jappelli
(1990). Nevertheless, the framework has been used in a number of studies in other
ﬁelds of economics, and Maddala (1986) provides an excellent survey based on this
framework. Lee and Porter (1984) use the same framework to test the price behavior
under ﬁrm collusion in the industry, whereby the binary variable of whether ﬁrms
are in collusion is deemed as imperfectly observed. Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) also
employ the same framework to identify the existence of signiﬁcant bequest motives
for the elderly that are often hard to detect otherwise.
Due to data limitations, this paper makes normal distributional assumptions.
These assumptions hold well with our consumption data, and the switching re-
gression model ﬁts data better than conventional estimation that employs imperfect
measures directly (the sample splitting estimation procedure henceforth). Switch-
ing regression results are robust to choices of constructed classiﬁcation criterion
variables, whereas sample splitting estimates are more vulnerable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sketches the theory (the
Becker-Tomes model) underlying the empirical work and reviews sample-splitting
estimates from previous literature; Section 3 motivates and presents switching re-
gression estimates applied to the same data accompanied with related speciﬁcation




tergenerational transmission in economic status, which is conventionally conducted
by the following regression:
logXc = logXp + U
where Xc and Xp are measurements of some economic variable of interest for parents
and children respectively. In literature,  is often labeled as the intergenerational
persistence, or the degree of intergenerational regression toward the mean, meaning how
much of the economic dierence among parents is bestowed onto their children;
correspondingly, 1  is referred to as the intergenerational mobility. The logarithm of
the variable indicates that we are measuring the dierence in the relative level rather
than the absolute level. The Becker-Tomes model oers an insightful interpretation
of .
2.1 The Becker-Tomes Model
As shown by Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan (1997), the degree of inter-
generational consumption transmission diers between families that leave ﬁnancial
assets to children and families that do not, if the capital market for ﬁnancing invest-
ments in the human capital of children is imperfect. Given that rates of return on
children’s human capital are initially very high and diminish with the investment
6amount, parents choose to invest in human capital ﬁrst until the rate of return falls
to market returns attainable from investing in other ﬁnancial assets. By this token,
families transferring ﬁnancial assets to children in the post-investment stage should
have had no diculty ﬁnancing their human capital investment; in other words,
they should belong to unconstrained families while the rest belong to constrained
families.
We present here a simpliﬁed version of Becker-Tomes model assuming a perfect-
foresight economy. The main implications are preserved when uncertainty is added
(Mulligan 1997). Suppose individuals live through two consecutive time periods:
childhood and adulthood. Each parent has exactly one ospring and his child’s
childhood overlaps with the parent’s adulthood. The child has no role in human
capital investment decision-making. By the time she grows up and starts working,
the parent is assumed to pass away.
The parent decides how to allocate his resources between (1) his own consump-
tion; (2) his investment in his child’s human capital; (3) the amount of ﬁnancial
transfer he is willing to pass onto his child. For the sake of simplicity, grandchildren
have no explicit role in the model. Figure 1 presents the timetable for the parent and
child in this model.
The budget constraint for the parent is:
Cp + h + T = I (2.1a)
T  0 (2.1b)
where Cp is parental consumption level, h is the human capital investment on his
7child, and T is the ﬁnancial transfer from parent to child. (2.1b) excludes the pos-
sibility for the parent to borrow against the child’s future earnings, due to the
non-collateral feature of children’s human capital. The budget constraint for the
adult child is:
Cc = (1 + R)T + Bh
v (2.2)
where R is the intergenerational rate of return on ﬁnancial assets, and B is the child’s
innate ability. As we normalize the labor supply of everyone in the economy to
one, the human capital production function Bhv converts the investment amount
and innate ability into the outcome of the child’s earnings, where 0 < v < 1 captures
the characteristic of the diminishing rate of return from such an investment.













where(> 0)capturesthedegreeofaltruismofparenttochild. (> 0)istheelasticity
of intergenerational consumption substitution. The parent’s optimal problem is to
maximize (2.3) subject to (2.1) and (2.2). Let  = 1 if the borrowing constraint (2.1b)
is not binding (hence the parent transfers some assets to the child), and let  = 0 if
otherwise (hence the parent makes no transfer of assets to the child). When  = 1,
the ecient human capital investment amount is solved by equalizing the rate of
return between human capital and ﬁnancial capital investment
vBh


















Therefore the function for the indicator () of being unconstrained is
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
 = 1 if I  I0
 = 0 if I < I0
(2.5)
Moreover, the amount of asset transfer from parent to child when the family is
unconstrained can be solved out and expressed as
T =
I   h   (1 + R)(h=v)((1 + R)) 
1 + (1 + R)[(1 + R)]  (2.6)
whereby we assume , v, and R are uniform across families, but  and B are more
likely to dier, and are presumably unobservable.
We solve for the consumption persistence equations for both constrained and
unconstrained cases:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
logCc = logCp + (log + log(1 + R)) if  = 1
logCc = v
v+(1 v) logCp + 
v+(1 v)(vlog(v) + logB) if  = 0
which suggests a system of regression equations for the consumption of these two
9types of families:
logCc = 1 logCp + U1 if  = 1 (2.7a)
logCc = 0 logCp + U0 if  = 0 (2.7b)
Since 0 < v
v + (1   v) < 1, the model predicts 1 > 0 in (2.7). Although it is not
a focus of this paper, one may be concerned that the error terms in subequations
of (2.7) may be a selected subset according to (2.4) and (2.5) and thus correlated
to I hence Cp. Han and Mulligan (2001) quantitatively investigate this issue for a
variety of numerical values of , and ﬁnd that this selection bias does not aect the
relative magnitudes of 1 and 0 save for the  much less than 1, when 1 and 0
become increasingly dicult to distinguish. Our results show 1 and 0 are indeed
dramatically dierent from each other.
2.2 Conventional Estimates from PSID
Theestimationof(2.7)callsforparents’andchildren’sconsumptionmeasuredatthe
comparable age and ﬁnancial transfers from parents to children beyond the human
capital investment stage in children. PSID is the best source for this purpose for the
U.S. population, as the survey started in 1968 and has covered several generations
of families up to the present.
Mulligan (1997, 1999) estimate the implications from Becker-Tomes model on
a sample of 1781 parent-child pairs from PSID. Parents are observed in 1968-72
and adult children are observed in 1984-1989 at comparable ages. Adult children
were already in the job market and made their earnings by the time. Consumption
10is constructed as the weighted average of a household’s expenditures on food at
home, food away from home, rent and the value of the family’s house; the weights
are taken from Skinner’s (1987) study which generates the weights of these afore-
mentioned individual consumption components by regressing total consumption
on these individual components from CEX (Consumer Expenditure Surveys) data.
Regarding asset transfers from parents to children, there are no detailed data in
PSID, especially on inter vivos transfers. The closest measure was in 1984, when
PSID respondents were asked about their inheritance receipts, including the inher-
itance they received up to 1984, as well as how much they expected to receive in
the future. This data is used in Mulligan (1997) to classify sampled families into
constrained versus unconstrained groups. More speciﬁcally, Mulligan uses the sum
of anticipated and actual inheritance of adult children as of the year 19842 to split
the sample by a ﬁxed cut-o value of 25;000 dollars. Since only 9% of adult children
in the sample did receive actual inheritance at some point prior to 1984, for the sake
of convenience we will label his constructed variable as the expected inheritance.
Again the implicit rationale for splitting up the sample by expected inheritance is
that children who expected sizable inheritance from parents are unlikely to have
had diculty getting ﬁnancial support for schooling, quality health care and other
forms of human capital investment3. Summary statistics by expected inheritance
in Table 1 (more on actual inheritance later) conﬁrm that in families where adult
2Answering ”no” or having missing values in anticipated inheritance will be treated as zero.
3The Becker-Tomes model outlined in last subsection could be augmented with parent’s uncer-
tainty and expectations about future return shocks when the inheritance is to be passed on; even
then, the main implications do not change (Han and Mulligan 2001). The parent’s expectation about
how much he is to bequeath to his child is more relevant based upon a faithful interpretation of
the model; therefore, the implicit assumption is that children’s expectation coincides closely with
parents’ expectation.
11children expect sizable inheritance, their parents do earn more and consume more.
This suggests the construction of a binary variable of expected inheritance (De = 1
if a child expects more than $25;000 inheritance; De = 0 if otherwise) as the proxy in
subsequent switching regression estimation.
The main ﬁnding from Mulligan (1997) is that signiﬁcant dierences do not
seem to exist between unconstrained and constrained families regarding the degree
of consumption persistence, from OLS, IV, or MLE estimates, as summarized by
Table 2, and, if anything, the unconstrained families may exhibit a lower degree
of persistence in consumption than constrained ones, although economically not
signiﬁcantly dierent between the two4. We test statistically whether ˆ 1 = ˆ 0 can be
rejected for the OLS estimates by using the procedure outlined in Chow (1960) after
replicating Mulligan’s results using the same data. The F statistic is 14:53 and rejects
the null hypothesis at 1% level.
Incontrast,thefactthatthereisnosigniﬁcantdierenceinmagnitudebetweenthe
twogroupsmaybearesultoftheimperfectempiricalprocedure,beforetheevidence
is taken to evaluate the underlying theoretical model. For example, the threshold
$25;000 is set arbitrarily, and not every single family with expected inheritance less
than 25;000 dollars is borrowing constrained if there is any sort of measurement
error embedded in the variable. Moreover, respondents’ insensitivity to one of the
phrases used in the 1984 survey questionnaire about anticipated inheritance may
shed doubts on their answers as the correct empirical counterpart corresponding to
the theoretical model.
4The estimate by MLE plus IV exhibits a fairly large gap between constrained and unconstrained
families. On the other hand, whether the instrument of parental income is valid in this case is
arguable, for the Becker-Tomes model clearly explains that the constrained children’s consumption
will be tied to their parents’ income level.
12(k157) What about future inheritances — are you fairly sure that you
(or someone in your family living there) will inherit some money or
property in the next ten years?
It is not clear how many respondents have noticed the qualifying phrase at the end
oftheposedquestion. Ifachildwasfairlysurethatherwealthyparentswouldleave
her a sizable bequest but not sure that they would pass away in the next ten years,
she would choose to answer no instead of yes.
We supplement the variable of parents’ vital status (Deceased, Alive or N/A) as
of 1984 and as of 1994 into the current sample. Figure 2 shows parents’ vital status
distribution in relationship to how adult children responded to the anticipated in-
heritancequestion. Itshowsthatthedistributionalshapeforchildrenwhoanswered
”Yes” to the question is roughly the same as that for those who answered ”No.” The
majority of respondents anticipating that they would receive inheritance in years
1984 - 1994 had both of their parents alive in 1984 as well as in 1994. Remarkably,
thispatternisalsotrueforrespondentswhoindicatedthattheywerenotanticipating
any inheritance for the same period. Among the few respondents who had neither
parent alive at the time of survey in 1984, some still expressed their anticipation of
inheritance from some other source. Among those whose parents had both passed
away by the time of the 1994 survey, more than half had indicated no anticipation
of future inheritance back in 1984. These pieces of evidence all suggest the data on
expected inheritance are unavoidably error-ridden.
133 Measurement Error, Misclassiﬁcation, and Switching
Regression Estimates
As we have argued in last section, the fact that inter vivos transfers are not recorded
is a legitimate concern, because it can lead to measurement error by using inheri-
tance as a proxy for borrowing constraint status. Other than that, the measurement
error embedded in expected inheritance may stem from three additional sources:
(1) respondents did not truthfully report their beliefs; (2) respondents expected in-
heritance from someone else other than their parents; (3) respondents inaccurately
assessed the amount of expected inheritance. Unfortunately, the data will not allow
us to separate all of these sources of measurement error. Regardless, the measure-
ment error can cause misclassiﬁcation of families from one group to the other, which
will bring up the attenuation of estimates. Estimates from switching regressions
attempting to correct for the attenuation bias exemplify this claim.
3.1 The Misclassiﬁcation due to Measurement Error
This subsection demonstrates the misclassiﬁcation caused by the measurement er-
ror in expected inheritance, T. In our deﬁnition of unconstrained families, positive
inheritance is one-to-one mapping to unconstrained status in intergenerational in-
vestment for a particular observation indexed i
Pr(i = 1 j Ti > 0) = 1 (3.1)
14Suppose instead of observing T, we observe an error-riden variable T = T   ".
Equation (3.1) becomes
Pr(i = 1 j T

i + "i > 0) = 1 (3.2)
Using the dummy indicator D to represent the constraint status by employing T,
for any particular "i, we have
Pr(i = 1 j Di = 1;"i) = Pr(Ti > 0 j T

i > 0;"i) = Pr(Ti > 0 j Ti > "i;"i)
=
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :




Pr(T > "i) if "i < 0
(3.3)
where fT(T) is the probability density function of T. Since "i is unobservable, we
integrate over its support for the subsample Di = 1
Pr(i = 1 j Di = 1) =
Z +1
 1
Pr(i = 1 j Di = 1;"i)f"(")d"







which is of some value between 0 and 1 under regular assumptions about distribu-
tions FT(:) and F"(:). Essentially this equation says the subsample (and the other one
with Di = 0) will be a mixed group of the two, and Lee and Porter (1984) proves that
such a misclassiﬁcation will lead to attenuation bias in estimated 1.
Studies on liquidity constraints, in addition to Mulligan (1997), such as Zeldes
(1989) and Runkle (1991), have considered a mean-shifting measurement error in ",
or equivalently, an arbitrarily speciﬁed positive cut-o value instead of 0. Therefore
15instead of (3.2), we have
Pr(i = 1 j T

i + "i > ¯ T) = 1 (3.5)
where ¯ T is some positive number. Correspondingly, (3.4) now becomes




1   FT(¯ T + ")
d"  p(¯ T) (3.6)




which states that when the threshold is lifted, we should expect the subsample Di
as deﬁned to enclose more and more genuinely i = 1 observations, and thus the
attenuation bias for 1 would be alleviated. However, also associated with lifting
thresholds, the sample size of Di = 1 is shrinking which may lead to imprecise and
less robust estimates.
3.2 Switching Regression Estimates
Adopt the notation that
Pr(i = 1 j Di = 1; ¯ T) = p1(¯ T); Pr(i = 0 j Di = 0; ¯ T) = p0(¯ T)
16For the two subsamples of Di, the likelihood function derived from (2.7) in view of
possibility of misclassiﬁcations will be
f(logCi;c j Di = 1) = p1(¯ T)f(logCi;c j i = 1) + (1   p1(¯ T))f(logCi;c j i = 0) (3.7a)
f(logCi;c j Di = 0) = (1   p0(¯ T))f(logCi;c j i = 1) + p0(¯ T)f(logCi;c j i = 0) (3.7b)
The identiﬁcation of elements in the likelihood function (3.7a) requires: (1)
(U1;U0) in (2.7) follow a speciﬁc family of distributions whose ﬁnite-mixture can
be identiﬁed up to subscripts, notably normal distributions (Yakowitz and Spragins
1968); (2) the prior information that p1(¯ T) + p0(¯ T) > 1 (also called Monotonicity Con-
dition in the econometrics literature), namely, relying on the imperfect proxy D is
better than without it to predict , which is already implicitly present in the cited
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1()p1 + 0()(1   p1)
iDi h
1()(1   p0) + 0()p0
i1 Di
(3.8)
where i() is the PDF of Ui.
For completeness we delegate the proof of identiﬁcation in the Appendix A.
Lee and Porter (1984) lay out the practical procedure on the maximum likelihood
function in estimation. Depending on the case at hand, we can re-parameterize the
functional form of p1 and p0 into probit or exponential functions as speciﬁed in the
17notes of tables reporting estimates.
We use the same intergenerational sample as in Mulligan (1997, 1999) to fa-
cilitate the comparison of results. The switching regression estimates in Table 3
dier remarkably from when the proxy variable D is used directly. Under the
prior assumption that children anticipating sizable inheritance receipts are more
likely to be in unconstrained families, it turns out that constrained families have a
higher consumption persistence rate of 1:05 as opposed to 0:44 for unconstrained
families, larger than the previous conventional estimates. The coecient for the
unconstrained case does not change signiﬁcantly, for the majority of the popula-
tion is unconstrained based upon our estimation. Meanwhile, the interpretation of
Pr( = 1 j D = 1)   Pr( = 1 j D = 0) reveals that the families whose children expect
more inheritance are 7:4% more likely to be unconstrained than the others, although
this dierence is not statistically signiﬁcant due to the small sample size of D = 1.
The evidence taken as a whole suggests that unconstrained families comprise above
80 percent of the population, which surprisingly is fairly close to Jappelli’s (1990)
ﬁndings that 19 percent of families are rationed in the credit market from directly
observed data5.
3.3 The Actual Inheritance and Robustness Check
The likelihood of measurement error in expected inheritance motivates the use of
actually received inheritance for a robustness check. It is reasonable to assume that
those who actually receive sizable inheritance should be more likely to belong to
5The data in Jappelli’s study do not provide details about categories of the loans applied by these
families, e.g., children’s college education loans, or mortgage loans, therefore it is not clear whether
and to what extent these loans are related to children’s human capital investments.
18unconstrained families. The exception would be those parents who happened to
experience ﬁnancial windfalls during their old age6; in such cases, the actual inheri-
tance would diverge from what parents intended to leave for children immediately
following the phase of human capital investment. Thus, this becomes a source of
measurementerrorforusingactualinheritanceastheproxy. Thishassimilarimpacts
on estimation as those from respondents misreporting their expected inheritance. A
priori We could not tell which inheritance variable is closer to the constraint status,
the variable of interest, in the theoretical model.
Gaviria (2002) investigates the reliability of expected inheritance by using actual
inheritance to classify the two groups and estimate their respective earnings mobil-
ity through sample splitting estimations. He constructs a new variable to classify
families,withthecriterionofwhetherchildrenreportedreceivingmorethan$10;000
inheritance in 1984-1989 or whether their parents had more than $100;000 in wealth
in 1988. Families satisfying either of these two conditions will be qualiﬁed as un-
constrained. By using this criterion variable, Gaviria shows that the earnings or
wage mobility is indeed higher in unconstrained than in constrained families, just
as the Becker-Tomes model predicts. Notwithstanding, Gaviria does not consider
the possibility of misclassiﬁcation arising in this context; for instance, parents with
less than $100;000 wealth may still have suciently funded their children’s human
capital investment.
Actual inheritance information is inquired retrospectively in 1984-1999 once ev-
ery ﬁve years, and in years 2001 and 2003. In the PSID 1989 survey the question of
actual inheritance posed to the respondent is:
6Unfortunately, lack of information prevents us from examining who among them indeed did
experience ﬁnancial surprises during their old age.
19(G228)Somepeople’sassetscomefromgiftsandinheritances. During
the last ﬁve years, have you (or anyone in your family living there) re-
ceivedanylargegiftsorinheritancesofmoneyorpropertyworth$10;000
or more?
If a respondent answers ”Yes”, more questions will follow regarding the size and
receiptyear. Weusethesumofinﬂation-adjustedactualinheritancereceivedoverthe
yearsupto2003todividetheobservationsintotheunconstrainedversusconstrained
group, sticking to the same threshold value $25;0007. About 79:1% of these adult
children have received zero or have missing values up to 2003. Figure 3 plots
the distribution density of inheritance received by those grown children who have
received positive inheritance, from which we observe that $25;000 is near the mode
and mean of the distribution. Table 5 shows that a majority of these households
have neither anticipated nor actually received inheritance over the period of 1984-
2003, and the proportion of those with actual inheritance more than $25;000 is
below 10 percent. Back to Table 1, it again conﬁrms the approximate validity of this
second proxy as well: on average those who received actual inheritance do enjoy
advantageous economic conditions: higher income, higher consumption and more
schooling years.
Table 6 presents estimates from sample splitting OLS and from switching regres-
7Although each year the attrition rate of the PSID sample is fairly small (< 5%), over the years,
it accumulates many cases of missing values for actual inheritance. We code these attrition cases as
if their actual inheritance received is less than $25;000, which could be the counterpart of response
error associated with expected inheritance, for some of them may have received amounts greater
than $25;000. Table 4 investigates whether attrition causes systematic discrepancy of some of the
relevant variables for attrited observations as opposed to non-attrited ones by conducting one of the
non-parametric tests. It can be observed that statistically signiﬁcant observations from families with
low consumption, of sons instead of daughters, of married instead of unmarried are more likely to
disappear over survey years.
20sions using the constructed binary variable from the actual inheritance (Da = 1 if
a child received more than $25;000 inheritance; Da = 0 if otherwise) as the proxy
indicator. Sample splitting estimates are dierent from those obtained when using
the expected inheritance proxy variable ( now labeled as De to dierentiate): we ﬁnd
0:63forthoselikelytobeunconstrained(Da = 1)asopposedto0:52forthoselikelyto
be constrained (Da = 0). In contrast, the estimates from switching regression are al-
most identical to the previous ones: 0:44 for unconstrained and 1:02 for constrained.
Without receiving a sizable inheritance, the family will be unconstrained with prob-
ability 0:84; for families receiving sizable inheritance, this probability increases to
0:93.
Since the switching regression model does not treat each observation as deﬁ-
nitely in one group or the other, intuitively, it should yield more robust results than
sample splitting methods that directly use the proxy. The advantage of switching
regressionsisthatwecaneliminatethesensitivitycausedbyarbitrarilychoosingand
shifting a threshold value. In our data, the actual inheritance has more non-missing,
continuous values than expected inheritance, enabling us to check the robustness in
this regard. Table 7 conﬁrms this intuition. We change the cut-os of actual inheri-
tance from $ 0 to $ 50;000 to see how these two approaches fare against each other.
Direct sample splitting OLS estimates under dierent cut-o values reveals that the
threshold of $ 40;000 will generate 0:69 versus 0:52, the most signiﬁcant contrast
among all thresholds. However, the switching regression does not show that much
dierence in estimates for varying threshold values: for unconstrained, it is always
around 0:44; and for constrained ones, it is always around 1:0.
The reverse magnitude in sample splitting estimates using actual inheritance
21criterion compared to using expected inheritance may be caused by random noise in
constructing the classifying variable, or by systematic underlying economic drives.
Table 8 presents what predicts the amount of actual inheritance an adult child has
received, conditional on a host of variables of parents and adult children, including
the expected inheritance dummy. This is not intended to be a thorough prediction
regression, for we do not have information for most of these parents at their old age.
The ﬁrst column is from OLS estimation with standard errors clustered by families,
and the second column is from a Tobit regression. The absolute magnitude of these
two regressions is somewhat dierent, but the relative signiﬁcance of coecients
between variables for each regression is similar. The ﬁrst noteworthy attribute is
that actual inheritance is highly correlated with expected inheritance: on average
those who expected to receive more did receive more in their lifetime. The second




parents to children, which suggests that the wealth eect, indicating the variation
in wealth level is much greater than that in children’s innate abilities, is indeed the
ﬁrst-order eect.




variable constructed as before. For simplicity let D denote this vector of variables.
22We also set the functional form of the switching equation as F(D0) = 1
1 + exp(D
0),











The identiﬁcation for which estimate belongs to unconstrained and which belongs
to constrained still follows the discussion related to (3.8). In particular, if a negative
sign of the coecient before a particular inheritance variable D in F() indicates that
an increasing value of D implies more propensity of association with 1(), the inter-
pretation following the theoretical model is still that more inheritance is regarded as
morelikelytobeunconstrained, thuswecouldassociateparametersin1()withthe
unconstrained group. Table 9 presents the results. The persistence rate of consump-
tion for unconstrained group is 0:43 and that for constrained group is 0:91, showing
no signiﬁcant changes compared to previous estimates. Both signs of coecients for
expected inheritance and actual inheritance agree with each other, and both coe-
cients are nearly statistically signiﬁcant. Another interesting ﬁnding concerns the
dummy variable of daughter, whose coecient is in the opposite direction of those
of inheritance variables and is statistically signiﬁcant.
We also plot simulated data of children’s consumption based upon switching
regression parameters along with the raw data as well as sample splitting OLS
predicted children’s consumption data. Figure 4 and Figure 5 simulate data from
switching regression estimates by using either of the two proxies. They show that
the simulated data from switching regressions ﬁt raw data better than those from
sample splitting OLS, especially in capturing the tails of the distribution.
234 Conclusion
This paper applies switching regressions to estimate intergenerational consumption
mobilityconcerningtheimplicationsdeliveredbyBecker-Tomesmodel. Theessence
oftheproblemisthatifafamily’sconstraintstatus,deﬁnedbyhowmuchassettrans-
fer the child receives from her parents, is imperfectly observed due to measurement
error, the resulting misclassiﬁcation error of constraint status will give rise to at-
tenuation bias, if the imperfect measure is employed directly. Through switching
regressions to account for possible misclassiﬁcation error brought in by the imper-
fect measure of parental ﬁnancial transfer, estimates reveal that intergenerational
consumption persistence is higher for constrained families than for unconstrained
families. Estimates from this framework are more robust across dierent proxy
variables and ﬁt data better.
The parametric assumption as well as the proxy condition can be relaxed if ad-
ditional instrumental-like variables for true status (Lewbel 2007, Mahajan 2006) or
independentlyrepeatedmeasurementsoftruestatus(Huforthcoming)areavailable.
Even with restrictive speciﬁc parametric distributional assumptions, it is still con-
structive to perceive switching regressions as opposed to the conventional sample
splitting procedure as a tradeo, the former wrapped in a more coherent method-
ology and generating more power in statistical tests while the latter free of distri-
butional assumption restrictions and easily implemented. A particular parametric
distribution assumption may subject the estimates of switching regressions to mis-
speciﬁcation error if true error terms signiﬁcantly deviate from it. How dierent
distributional assumptions bias the estimates awaits further research.
The most crucial question in light of our results is why are our estimates not in
24line with Becker-Tomes predictions? The heterogeneity in parental altruism may
partially account for this (Mulligan 1997), for which Mulligan (1999, Figure 5) oers
some simulation evidence. However, it is dicult to ﬁnd reasonable parameters to
account for the magnitude observed in our estimates (0:44 versus 1:04) by resorting
to this source of heterogeneity.
The crucial justiﬁcation for conducting such an estimation of the Becker-Tomes
model is that parental asset transfer, if positive, indicates the ecient human capital
investments have been achieved. This results from the one-period lifetime assump-
tion as well as the diminishing returns to investments in human capital, yet neither
of them necessarily holds. Cunha and Heckman (2007) argue that human capital
investments on children may be multi-stage in nature, and later investments are
complementary to ones that are made earlier in one’s childhood. Following this suit
the bequests that parents leave to children in their late life may indicate nothing
about whether ecient investments have been made in children’s early childhood,
which would in turn state nothing about whether the ecient overall investments
have been achieved. More follow-up research should be explored on the determi-
nation of intergenerational mobility when variations of human capital production
technology are proposed.
References
Altonji, J. G., F. Hayashi, and L. J. Kotlikoff (1997): “Parental Altruism and Inter
Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence,” The Journal of Political Economy, 105(6),
1121–1166.
25Becker, G. S. (1989): “On the Economics of the Family: Reply to a Skeptic,” The
American Economic Review, 79(3), 514–518.
Becker, G. S., and N. Tomes (1986): “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of
Families,” Journal of Labor Economics, 4(3), S1–S39.
Bernanke, B. S. (1984): “Permanent Income, Liquidity, and Expenditure on Auto-
mobiles: Evidence From Panel Data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(3),
587–614.
Chetty, R. (2008): “Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insur-
ance,” Journal of Political Economy, 116(2), 173–234.
Chow, G. C. (1960): “Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coecients in Two Linear
Regressions,” Econometrica, 28(3), 591–605.
Cunha, F., and J. Heckman (2007): “The Technology of Skill Formation,” American
Economic Review, 97(2), 31–47.
Garcia, R., A. Lusardi, and S. Ng (1997): “Excess Sensitivity and Asymmetries in
Consumption: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
29(2), 154–176.
Gaviria, A. (2002): “Intergenerational Mobility, Sibling Inequality and Borrowing
Constraints,” Economics of Education Review, 21, 331–340.
Grawe, N. D. (2004): “Reconsidering the Use of Nonlinearities in Intergenerational
EarningsMobilityasaTestforCreditConstraints,”TheJournalofHumanResources,
39(3), 813–827.
26Han, S., and C. B. Mulligan (2001): “Human Capital, Heterogeneity and Estimated
Degrees of Intergenerational Mobility,” The Economic Journal, 111(470), 207–243.
Hu, Y. (forthcoming): “Identiﬁcation and Estimation of Nonlinear Models with
Misclassiﬁcation Error Using Instrumental Variables: a General Solution,” Journal
of Econometrics.
Jappelli, T.(1990): “WhoisCreditConstrainedintheU.S.Economy?,” TheQuarterly
Journal of Economics, 105(1), 219–234.
Kiefer,N.M.(1979): “OntheValueofSampleSeparationInformation,”Econometrica,
47(4), 997–1003.
Kopczuk, W., and J. Lupton (2007): “To Leave or Not to leave: The Distribution of
Bequest Motives,” Review of Economic Studies, 74(1), 207–235.
Lee, L.-F., and R. H. Porter (1984): “Switching Regression Models with Imperfect
Sample Separation Information–With an Application on Cartel Stability,” Econo-
metrica, 52(2), 391–418.
Lewbel, A. (2007): “Estimation of Average Treatment Eects with Misclassiﬁcation,”
Econometrica, 75(2), 537–551.
Maddala, G. (1986): “Disequilibrium, Self-selection, and Switching Models,” in
Handbook of Econometrics, ed. by Z. Griliches, and M. Intriligator, vol. 3, chap. 28,
pp. 1633–1688. North-Holland.
Mahajan, A. (2006): “Identiﬁcation and Estimation of Regression Models with Mis-
classiﬁcation,” Econometrica, 74(3), 631–665.
27Mulligan, C. B. (1997): Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
(1999): “Galton versus the Human Capital Approach to Inheritance,” The
Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), S184–S224.
Rice, J. A. (2007): Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis. Thompson/Brooks/Cole,
Belmont, CA, 3rd edn.
Runkle, D. E. (1991): “Liquidity Constraints and the Permanent-income Hypothesis
: Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 27(1), p73 – 98.
Skinner, J. (1987): “A Superior Measure of Consumption from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics,” Economics Letters, 23(2), 213 – 216.
Yakowitz, S. J., and J. D. Spragins (1968): “On the Identiﬁability of Finite Mixtures,”
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 39(1), 209–214.
Zeldes, S. P. (1989): “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Inves-
tigation,” The Journal of Political Economy, 97(2), 305–346.
A Proof of Identiﬁcation of Switching Regressions
Yakowitz and Spragins (1968) prove that ﬁnite-mixture distributions can be partially
identiﬁed in the sense of the following: suppose for two ﬁnite-mixture distributions





ciP(x;i); whereci > 0;
N X
i=1
















i = 1 (A.1b)
If H(x) = H0(x) for all x on the support, then
(1) N = M;
(2) for each i, 1  i  N there is some j, 1  j  N, such that ci = c0
j and i = 0
j.
Itisworthnotingthatidoesnothavetobeequalto jinabove; thisisthecasewewill
say the subscripts are not identiﬁed. Suppose in the model the subscript 1 and 0 refer
to regime 1 and 0 respectively, c1 is the probability associated with regime 1, and
c0 is the probability associated with regime 0. Estimation will generate us two sets
of estimates (ˆ 1;cˆ 1) and (ˆ 0;cˆ 0), where we assign ˆ 1 to mark the set of estimates that
has larger magnitude of some criterion than the other set, whatever this criterion is
(e.g., the kth coordinate of , or the metric size of ), and ˆ 1 and ˆ 0 suggest they may
not necessarily correspond to 1 and 0 respectively. Under this notation, unidentiﬁed
subscripts essentially imply the econometrician cannot distinguish the following
two possibilities:
1 = ˆ 1; c1 = cˆ 1; 0 = ˆ 0; c0 = cˆ 0; (A.2a)
1 = ˆ 0; c1 = cˆ 0; 0 = ˆ 1; c0 = cˆ 1: (A.2b)
Remarkably, the estimated probability associated with ˆ 1 or ˆ 0 is never confused,
29i.e., the following two cases are ruled out decisively:
1 = ˆ 1; c1 = cˆ 0; 0 = ˆ 0;c0 = cˆ 1; (A.3a)
1 = ˆ 0; c1 = cˆ 1; 0 = ˆ 1; c0 = cˆ 0: (A.3b)
That (A.2a) and (A.2b) are unidentiﬁable from each other, and (A.3a) and (A.3b)
can be ruled out is crucial for subsequent identiﬁcation theorem that we attempt to
prove. For convenience we give these two formal deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Unidentiﬁability of subscripts). In a model with two identiﬁable mixtures,
(A.2a) and (A.2b) are unidentiﬁable from each other.
Deﬁnition 2 (Identiﬁability of probability association). In a model with two identiﬁable
mixtures, (A.3a) and (A.3b) are ruled out.
Now let us state the complete identiﬁcation theorem.
Theorem 1. Deﬁne the proxy D as
0 < p1  Pr( = 1 j D = 1) < 1 (A.4a)
0 < p0  Pr( = 0 j D = 0) < 1 (A.4b)
Let 1() and 0() be the normal PDFs of (U1;U0) in (2.7) respectively. With the Mono-
tonicity Condition p1+p0 > 1, 1() (hence 1), 0() (hence 0), p1 and p0 can be completely
identiﬁed.
Proof. Partition the sample into two groups according to observable D. For the
subsample D = 1, according to the deﬁnition of partial identiﬁability above, we can
30identify, say, a() and b() (along with associated probabilities pa and pb, pa+pb = 1);
for the subsample D = 0, we can identify, say, c() and d() (along with associated
probabilities pc and pd, pc + pd = 1).
We ﬁrst show that two normals can be patially identiﬁed in the sense that their
subscripts are not able to be matched with 1 or 0 at this stage, that is, that one of the
following must hold
(a();b()) = (c();d()) (A.5a)
(a();b()) = (d();c()) (A.5b)
Assume, on the contrary, that neither is true, which means at least one of a and b is
dierentfromeitherofc andd. Underthiscircumstance, ifD = 1groupandD = 0
group are pooled back together, the original population would be a mixture of more
than two normals instead of just two, which will violate the patial identiﬁability of
ﬁnite-mixture distributions cited above.
Without loss of generality, suppose (A.5a) is the case from the ﬁrst stage. We then
showthatthesubscriptscanbesecuredwiththeassistanceoftheMonotonicityCon-
dition. Referring to the likelihood (3.8), we have to dierentiate the two possibilities
below with the associated probabilities, either one is consistent with the maximized
likelihood:
(1();0()) = (a();b()) = (c();d()); p1 = pa; p0 = pd (A.6a)
(1();0()) = (b();a()) = (d();c()); p1 = pb; p0 = pc (A.6b)
However, only one of (A.6a) and (A.6b) concerning p1 and p0 will satisfy the Mono-
31tonicity Condition, hence the subscripts are identiﬁed. 
B Figures and Tables
Figure 1: An illustration of timetable for overlapping generations -
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32Table 1: Summary statistics of relevant variables by expected and actual
inheritance size in PSID intergenerational sample
Variable Obs.
(a) Mean Std. Dev.  Min. Max
Parent's age 
(b) 66 43.0 7.9 29 61
Parent's income 
(c) 66 41407.35 27667.92 6536.15 119037.00
Parent's consumption 
(c) 66 21386.75 8167.39 6833.33 40624.45
Parent's wage 
(d) 56 13.44 7.85 3.00 44.41
Parent's education achievement 
(e) 66 12.39 4.08 1 18
Child's age 
(f) 66 31.9 2.6 27 36
Child's income 
(c) 66 40043.55 16881.34 14630.28 95879.47
Child's consumption 
(c) 66 19162.79 8560.21 7122.23 47559.20
Child's wage 
(d) 64 9.34 5.22 1.05 30.94
Child's education achievement 
(e) 66 14.29 2.10 8 18
Parent's age 153 42.0 7.3 29 67
Parent's income 153 29366.85 17224.92 5949.39 101165.00
Parent's consumption 153 17644.44 7187.16 5124.98 38777.73
Parent's wage 140 10.07 6.10 1.60 30.39
Parent's education achievement 153 10.73 3.59 1 18
Child's age 153 31.8 2.6 27 36
Child's income 153 32050.94 25822.68 542.61 191891.10
Child's consumption 153 14779.99 8894.92 689.28 66374.76
Child's wage 150 9.21 7.59 0.80 69.72
Child's education achievement 153 13.36 2.23 8 18
Parent's age 99 41.6 7.8 25 68
Parent's income 99 36942.06 17970.01 6571.03 85263.95
Parent's consumption 99 21635.12 9220.81 7523.91 50475.52
Parent's wage 90 13.33 6.77 3.29 32.81
Parent's education achievement 99 12.04 3.41 4 18
Child's age 99 30.6 2.9 25 36
Child's income 99 33447.17 20496.73 1875.80 104424.40
Child's consumption 99 16274.73 8270.92 1544.90 38814.39
Child's wage 96 9.48 5.48 0.89 38.22
Child's education achievement 99 14.18 2.15 8 18
Parent's age 1463 39.9 7.3 22 74
Parent's income 1463 27452.50 19523.75 3574.94 234521.40
Parent's consumption 1463 16694.53 7312.35 3537.27 50475.52
Parent's wage 1250 9.82 7.49 0.15 90.84
Parent's education achievement 1459 10.21 3.62 1 18
Child's age 1463 31.3 2.6 25 36
Child's income 1463 25791.74 18688.22 78.76 270242.10
Child's consumption 1463 12721.57 6756.71 134.72 64269.83
Child's wage 1396 8.00 5.04 0.16 53.04
Child's education achievement 1463 13.08 2.14 3 18
Notes: (a) number of observations with non-missing values; (b) father's age of 1967; (c) in 
thousand dollars; (d) in dollars; (e) years of schooling; (f) child's age of 1987.
Expected Inheritance ≥ $25,000, and Actual Inheritance ≥ $25,000
Expected Inheritance ≥ $25,000, and Actual Inheritance < $25,000
Expected Inheritance < $25,000, and Actual Inheritance ≥ $25,000
Expected Inheritance < $25,000, and Actual Inheritance < $25,000













b. Parental income is used as an instrument for parental 
consumption.
Estimation Method
Source: Mulligan(1997);                                                
Notes: Sample size is 219 for the group De=1, 1562 for 
the group De=0. Standard errors in brackets.
a. De=1--expected inheritance greater than $25,000; 







34Figure 2: Parental vital status distribution as of 1984 and 1994 decomposed by

























Source: author’s calculation; sample size is 1781;
first digit of the two−digit string indicates the vital status of father;
second digit of the two−digit string indicates the vital status of mother;
0 −− deceased; 1 −− alive; 2 −−  deceased or alive N/A;
The 1984 inheritance expectation question is explained in text.
decomposed by child’s answer to inheritance expectation question at 1984
Parental Vital Status Distribution: 1984 and 1994
1984 1994
35Table 3: Switching regression and sample splitting OLS regression of









(c) 0.4394 1.0527 0.4491 0.5487
(0.0237) (0.1425) (0.0770) (0.0358)
daughter dummy -0.0400 0.3524 0.0282 -0.0232
(0.0207) (0.1146) (0.0655) (0.0280)
parental marital status -0.0210 0.0205 -0.0101 -0.0076
(0.0066) (0.0362) (0.0225) (0.0117)
child's marital status 0.4465 1.3008 0.6222 0.6058
(0.0246) (0.1438) (0.0990) (0.0345)
parent's age (x10
-1)
(d) -0.1130 -0.1810 0.7487 -0.1703
(0.1157) (0.7600) (0.4141) (0.1604)
parent's age squared (x10
-3)
(d) 0.1287 0.2534 -0.8822 0.1922
(0.1359) (0.8964) (0.4516) (0.1856)
child's age  (x10
-1)
(d) -1.0510 5.2938 0.4896 -0.2741
(0.8404) (4.1824) (3.2374) (1.2167)
child's age squared (x10
-3)
(d) 2.0703 -8.2160 -0.1292 0.6997
(1.3425) (6.6167) (5.1189) (1.9581)
(intercept) 6.4907 -10.540 1.7653 4.2185










Consumption persistence regression: expected inheritance as the proxy
Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption;
standard error in parenthesis; expected inheritance indicator is used as the proxy, hence
which set of parameters in switching regression corresponds to the regime of borrowing
constrained (∆=0) is identified. See text for details. (a) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained";
(b) 1--expected inheritance greater than $25,000; 0--expected inheritance less than $25,000;
(c) consumption is the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption
measure; (d) parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's
age as of 1987; (e) probability of being "unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the






OLS (clustering adjusted) Switching regression
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Sample size 372; adjusted for inflation over the years; x−axis in logarithm dollar scale.
by adult children of PSID intergenerational sample
Distribution of actual positive inheritance received up to 2003
Table 4: Two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of relevant variables
Attrition by 1994 Attrition by 2003
variable z-value P > jzj z-value P > jzj
Parental consumption (1968-1972) 1.420 0.156 4.867 0.000
Adult child consumption (1984-1989) 2.412 0.016 3.696 0.000
Daughter dummy 1.709 0.088 0.573 0.567
Parent married a 3.395 0.001 5.181 0.000
Adult child married a 3.743 0.000 5.249 0.000
Parental comparable age 1.138 0.255 2.085 0.037
Adult child’s comparable age 1.279 0.201 -0.476 0.634
Notes: sample size 1781; the null hypothesis is that there is no systematic
dierence of the distribution of the variable in question for those who
remain in surveys versus those who drop out of surveys;
a since the consumption is the average of measured consumption of several
years, thisvariablecaptureshowmanyyearstheparentoradultchildwas
being married of those years when consumption is measured.
37Table 5: Distribution of expected and actual inheritance by size
Expected Inheritance as of 1984 [$25,000, +∞) (0, $25,000) 0 / (missing)
Total 166 (9.3%) 171 (9.6%) 1444 (81.1%)
Actual Inheritance received
Prior to 1984
[$25,000, +∞) 10 (0.6%) 5 (0.3%) 39 (2.2%)
(0, $25,000) 12 (0.7%) 14 (0.8%) 81 (4.5%)
0 / (missing) 144 (8.1%) 152 (8.5%) 1324 (74.3%)
1984─1994
[$25,000, +∞) 26 (1.5%) 13 (0.7%) 70 (3.9%)
(0, $25,000) 25 (1.4%) 26 (1.5%) 123 (6.9%)
0 / (missing) 115 (6.5%) 132 (7.4%) 1251 (70.2%)
1994─2003
[$25,000, +∞) 16 (0.9%) 8 (0.4%) 39 (2.2%)
(0, $25,000) 8 (0.4%) 9 (0.5%) 52 (2.9%)
0 / (missing) 142 (8.0%) 154 (8.6%) 1353 (76.0%)
In total
[$25,000, +∞) 39 (2.2%) 20 (1.1%) 106 (6.0%)
(0, $25,000) 24 (1.3%) 31 (1.7%) 152 (8.5%)
0 / (missing) 103 (5.8%) 120 (6.7%) 1186 (66.6%)
Notes: figures in each cell include number of observations accompanied by the 
corresponding fraction relative to the whole sample size. 
Figure 4: Densities of ﬁtted and actual adult children’s consumption: estimates
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simulated by switching regression
OLS and switching regression estimated using expected inheritance proxy
Comparision of children consumption distributions
38Table 6: Switching regression and sample splitting OLS regression of









(c) 0.4398 1.0176 0.6254 0.5229
(0.0236) (0.1376) (0.0948) (0.0363)
daughter dummy -0.0400 0.3263 -0.0086 -0.0289
(0.0206) (0.1151) (0.0713) (0.0272)
parental marital status -0.0220 0.0240 -0.0506 -0.0065
(0.0066) (0.0360) (0.0306) (0.0112)
child's marital status 0.4474 1.2824 0.5212 0.6110
(0.0245) (0.1437) (0.1056) (0.0339)
parent's age (x10
-1)
(d) -0.1130 -0.2170 -0.2391 -0.0691
(0.1148) (0.7710) (0.3791) (0.1609)
parent's age squared (x10
-3)
(d) 0.1285 0.2854 0.2538 0.0675
(0.1346) (0.9063) (0.4260) (0.1858)
child's age  (x10
-1)
(d) -1.1060 4.4107 1.0696 -0.4862
(0.8388) (4.1255) (2.8681) (1.2236)
child's age squared (x10
-3)
(d) 2.1587 -6.7650 -1.0324 1.0615
(1.3412) (6.4890) (4.5347) (1.9639)
(intercept) 6.5716 -8.762 1.4808 4.5718










Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption; 
standard error in parenthesis; actual inheritance indicator is used as the proxy, hence which 
set of parameters in switching regression corresponds to borrowing constrained case (∆=0) 
is identified. See text for details. (a) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained"; (b) 1--expected 
inheritance greater than $25,000; 0--expected inheritance less than $25,000; (c) 
consumption is the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption measure; 
(d) parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's age as of 
1987; (e) probability of being "unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the value of 
proxy indicator Da; calculated from Ф(γ0+γ1Da), where Ф(.) is the CDF of standard normal 
distribution.








39Table 7: Estimated consumption persistence by using alternative cut-os of actual
inheritance for constructing the proxy indicator: OLS and switching regressions
Threshold value $0 $5k $10k $25k $30k $40k $50k
Sample Size (D = 1) 372 329 265 165 141 121 102
OLS regression estimates
1 (unconstrained) 0:5712 0:5449 0:5717 0:6254 0:6514 0:6905 0:6421
(0:0591) (0:0640) (0:0706) (0:0893) (0:0978) (0:1104) (0:1214)
0 (constrained) 0:5067 0:5126 0:5157 0:5229 0:5239 0:5278 0:5328
(0:0360) (0:0351) (0:0338) (0:0324) (0:0322) (0:0318) (0:0316)
Switching regression estimates
1 (unconstrained) 0:4401 0:4439 0:4426 0:4398 0:4396 0:4387 0:4353
(0:0236) (0:0237) (0:0237) (0:0236) (0:0236) (0:0237) (0:0236)
0 (constrained) 0:9889 0:9936 1:0061 1:0176 1:0269 0:9994 1:0461
(0:1408) (0:1417) (0:1390) (0:1376) (0:1310) (0:1368) (0:1597)
Pr( = 1 j D = 1) 0:9246 0:9220 0:9274 0:9284 0:9057 0:8876 0:9077
Pr( = 0 j D = 1) 0:0754 0:0780 0:0726 0:0716 0:0943 0:1124 0:0923
Pr( = 1 j D = 0) 0:8329 0:8411 0:8415 0:8399 0:8435 0:8419 0:8373
Pr( = 0 j D = 0) 0:1671 0:1589 0:1585 0:1627 0:1565 0:1581 0:1366
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Proxy indicator of borrowing constraint is con-
structed as follows: D = 1 if received actual inheritance is greater than the cut-o value,
and D = 0 if otherwise.
40Figure 5: Densities of ﬁtted and actual adult children’s consumption: estimates
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simulated by switching regression
OLS and switching regression estimated using actual inheritance proxy
Comparision of children consumption distributions
41Table 8: Prediction regression of actual inheritance received conditional on
expected inheritance





daughter dummy 0.4614 1.3271
(0.1880) (0.8785)
parental marital status 0.0100 0.1382
(0.0662) (0.3621)














parent's education 0.1407 0.6064
(0.0361) (0.1560)
child's education 0.1406 0.4629
(0.0535) (0.2442)
parent's household income of 1967-1971
(d) 0.7954 3.5462
(0.2325) (1.0235)








maximized loglikelihood -- -1956.95
Prediction of actual inheritance conditonal on expected
Notes: sample size 1777; dependent variable: adult child's log of actual
inheritance received; standard error in parenthesis; (a) treats those with zero
or missing actual inheritance as cencored observations for ajustments in
estimation; (b) a dummy variable, constructed as equal to one if the expected
inheritance is greater than $25,000 and equal to zero if less than $25,000; (c)
parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's
age as of 1987; (d) household income is the multi-year average of
corresponding years; (e) standard deviation of the error term assumed to be
normally distributed.
42Table 9: Switching regression estimates of intergenerational consumption









daughter dummy -0.0177 0.4942 0.8906
(0.0220) (0.1310) (0.2767)
parental marital status -0.0214 0.0184
(0.0072) (0.0312)
child's marital status 0.4206 1.2260
(0.0261) (0.1116)
parent's age
(d)  -0.0120 0.0043 0.0330
(0.0120) (0.0426) (0.0162)
parent's age squared  0.0002 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0005)
child's age
(d)   -0.1401 0.5345 0.0476
(0.0860) (0.4267) (0.0468)
child's age squared 0.0027 -0.0082
(0.0014) (0.0068)
expected inheritance (dummy)
(e) —— —— -0.6002
(0.4184)
log of actual inheritance
(f) —— —— -0.0630
(0.0351)





(b) probability of being "unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the value of a
vector of variables (including continuous variables) D, in the form of
F(Dγ)=1/(1+exp(Dγ)) in accordance to the identification of unconstrained group.
Consumption persistence switching regression: multivariate variables
-1098.00
Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption;
standard error in parenthesis; expected and actual inheritance are jointly used as
proxies, conditional on parents' age, children's age and gender.
(a) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained";
Regime equation
(f) continuous variable, computed as log of actual ammount of received inheritance.
(c) consumption is the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption
measure;
(e) 1--expected inheritance greater than $25,000; 0--expected inheritance less than
$25,000;
(d) parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's age
as of 1987;
43